Izvrstan članak Economista o ulozi poreza i “javnim dobrima”:
It’s true that we each benefit from the availability of genuinely public goods, but we benefit most if we are able to enjoy them without paying for them. A rationally self-interested individual will not voluntarily pay for public goods if she believes others will pay and she can get a free ride. But if we’re all rationally self-interested, and we know we’re all rationally self-interested, we know everyone else will also try to get a free ride, in which case it is doubly irrational to voluntarily pitch in. Even if you’re not inclined to ride for free, why throw good money at an enterprise bound to fail? By threatening coercion against those who refuse to pay, the state establishes the conditions under which it would not be pointless to pitch in—a condition in which you can be confident others will pitch in too. Tax collection solves the “assurance problem”, as the game theorists call it.
Generally, Rand’s moral and political philosophies run aground by failing to follow the correct but counterintuitve logic of the social contract tradition. The interests of individuals in society are best met when limits on self-interest are observed and enforced.